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IN THE S·UPR.EME. COUR:T
of the

STATE OF UTAH
\VILLARD R. WOOD,
Plaintiff and Responden.t,
-vs.-

Case No.

STREVELL-PATERSON HARDWARE
COMPANY, a corporation,
Defendant and .Appellant.

8632

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF FACTS
This .action arises out of a 1notor vehicle collision
which occurred on the 13th day of October, 1954, about
9:00 P.M. near the Saltair cutoff on U.S. Highway No.
40 "\Ve.st of the Salt Lake City Airport. Both drivers
"\Vere alone in their vehicles and were killed as a result
of the collision.
The action \Vas commenced by Mr. Wood to recover
damages fro1n Appellant, for the destruction of one of
the vehicles involved, which .at the time was being operated by one, Richard E. Gore, Mr. Wood's e1nployee.
(It was stipulated at the time of trial that the value of
Respondent's vehicle was $1,700.00.)
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On the day in question, Mr. Wayne N. Stoker, who
was an employee of Appellant, had been out toward
Dugway, Utah and had called on Mr. Howard Rich, who
operated an establishment about 10 miles this side of
Dugway, Utah and had taken an order for merchandise
from Mr. Rich. Mr. Stoker was returning to Salt Lake
City at the time of the accident.
The facts found at the scene of the accident show
that the collision occurred at a point at least three f~eet
into the lane of travel of the vehicle owned by ~Ir. Wood,
Respondent.
The two issues in the case before the trial court
were whether Mr. Stoker was \vithin the course and
scope of his employ for Appellant at the time of the
accident and vvhether he was negligent. The trial court
found both issues in favor of respondent and entered
judgment accordingly.
A further consideration of the facts \\ill be undertaken in the points of argument.
STATEMEN·T OF POINTS
POINT I.
'THE FINDINGS AND JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL
COURT MUST BE AFFIRMED, IF SUPPORTED BY SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE.
POINT II.
WAYNE N. STOKER WAS WITHIN THE ·COURSE AND
SICO·PE OF HIS EMPLOY FOR APPELLANT AT THE TIME
OF THE COLLISION.
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POINT III.
WAYNE N. STOKER, 'THE AGENT FOR APPELLANT,
WAS NEGLIGENT, AND SUCH NEGLIGENCE CAUSED
THE COLLISION.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE FINDINGS AND JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL
COURT MUS'T BE AFFIRMED, IF SU'P'POR,TED BY SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE.

The sole contention of appellant is that the findings
and judgment of the trial court (sitting without a jury)
are not supported by sufficient evidence. However, Appellant, in its brief, is asking this court to reconsider all
the evidence .and inferences arising therefrom in its favor
and to reach a conclusion contrary to that of the trial
court.
The familiar rule which must govern this appeal is
stated in 5 C.J.S., Appeal and Error, P. 699.
"In connection with the above question ( evidence to support or overturn findings) the appellate court's function is limited to an examination
of the record to ascertain if sufficient evidence
exists to justify the findings. If this is found, the
·examination of the appellate court ceases. It will
give no regard to rules as to the sufficiency of evidence to establish a state of facts contrary to
those found, nor will it, in accordanc-e with rule
stated infra Sec. 1658, concern itself with the question of wh·ere the preponderance of the evidence
may lie, although, if the preponderance of the evidence supports the findings, it is even more clear
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that they should not be disturbed.
"Under the rules set forth in subsection c
above, the appellate court in determining the
sufficiency of the evidence to sup·port the findings
will indulge in every presumption in their favor,
and give due weight to the trial court's superior
advantages in passing on the facts, and judging
the credibility of the witnes.ses.
"When considering whether the findings have
proper evidentiary support, the appellate court
will eliminate from consideration all incompetent
and linmaterial evidence, and consider only the
evidence most favorable to the successful party,
including all reasonable inferences which might
have been drawn therefrom, which will be construed most strongly in favor of the judgment.''
See also Seamons v. Anderson, 252 P.2d 209. (Utah),
one of numerous Utah decisions, on this point.
"The p,rimary assignment of error by all parties is in respect to th·e court's findings of fact.
Hence, if there is any competent evidence supporting such f~ndings, 've cannot disturb them."
The two issues in this case which .are again attacked
by appellant on app·eal must be considered "~thin the
framework of the foregoing rule.
POINT II.
WAYNE N. STOK·ER WAS WITHIN THE ·COURSE AND
S:COPE OF HIS EMPLOY FOR APPELLANT AT THE TIME
OF THE COLLISION.

Appellant is asking this court to reconsider aU of
the evidence and inferences arising therefrom touching
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on the question of agency, and make a finding contrary
to that of the trial court. This court need only consider
v1hether the finding of the trial court is supported by
sufficient evidence.
Sufficient evidence will be found in the testimony
of two witnesses: Mr. Hovvard Rich and Mr. Lawrence
W. Mansell.
~fr.

Howard Rich is the owner and proprietor of a
roadside establishment known as Los Ricos Station on the
highway to Dugway, Utah (R. 19). He ha.s been so engaged since 1948. He had kno,vn Mr. Wayne N. Stoker
for approximately four years prior to the collision resulting in his death and knew that he was a salesman for
appellant, Strevell-Paterson Hardware Company. During this four year period Mr. Stoker called at his place
of business two or three times per month. On most occasions he would give ~tfr. Stoker an order for merchandise,
consisting of sporting goods (guns and ammunition).
This merchandise would subsequently be shipped to him
by appellant (R. 20).
Testifying further, Mr. Rich stated that on October
13, 1954 (the day of the accident) Mr. Stoker called
at his place of business at .approximately 4 :00 P.M. (R.
20). ~1:r. Rich placed an order with him for ammunition
and one 12 gauge shot-gun. In addition, he gave Mr.
Stoker $57.00 in cash for a K-22 revolver which Mr.
Stoker had helped sell to a customer of Mr. Rich. (The
eash -vvas never recovered.) 11r. Stoker left Los Ricos
Station shortly after 5:00 P.M. [Counsel stipulated that
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thereafter Mr. Stoker stopped for dinner -at another
roadside diner called "Penny's" which is on the _road
toward Tooele, Utah and Salt Lake City (R. 8).] The
following day Mr. Rich learned of Mr. Stoker's death and
called appellant concerning his order. He restated his
order to appellant; (the identical merchandise ordered
from Mr. Stoker) the order was filled and the merchandise shipped to him (R. 20, 21, and Ex. 5).
These facts testified-to by Mr. Rich were not, in any
material respect, controverted by appellant.
Mr. Lawrence vV. 1\Iansell-Treasurer of Appellant
-then testified. Wayne N. Stoker had been employed
by appellant as a salesman since 1948. His specific instructions were to call on government installations in the
State of Utah. (Dugway, Tooele Ordnance, -:Clearfield
N.aval Supply, etc.) He was paid a monthly salary. It
was, of course, necessary that he use an automobile in
his employment and for this purpose he used his private
vehicle. At the end of each bi-n1onthly pay period he
would submit a regular expense form for mileage, which
was based on the nun1ber of 1uiles from the office of appellant in S.alt Lake (~ity to his points of call and return
( R. 42, 43). He \Yas, therefore, paid for the use of his
automobile.
Mr. Mansell stated further, that although Mr.
Stoker's · specific instructions \Vere to call on United
State.s government installations, nonetheless, any other
business which Ill r. Stoker obtained 1could be accepted
by his cJnployer (R. 48). (Later testifying, ~Ir. l{uhre,
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~ales1nanager

of appellant, stated that their record~
fihowed six orders from Mr. Rich during 1954, prior to the
Ol'der given ~fr. Stoker on the 13th of October, 1954.)
2 Anz. Jur., Agency, Section 101

"The liability of the p·rincipal for the acts
and contracts of his agent is not limited to such
acts .and contracts of the agent as are expressly
authorized, necessarily implied from express authority, or otherwise actually conferred by implication from the acts and conduct of the principal.
All such acts and contracts of the agent as .are
within the apparent scope of the authority conferred on him, although no actual authority to do
such acts or to make such contracts has been conferred, are also binding upon the principal."

2 Am. Jur., Agency, Sec. 104.
"The apparent authority of the agent is the
same, and is based upon the same elements as the
.authority created by the estoppel of the principal
to deny the agent's authority; that is to say, the
two are correlative, inasmuch as the principal
is estopped to deny the authority of the agent
because he has permitted the appearance of authority in the agent, thereby justifying the third
party in relying upon the same as though it \Vere
the authority actually eonferred upon the agent.''
Appellant cannot accept the benefits of prior orders
frorn l\fr. Rich and then deny the authority of the agent
on the order taken on the day of the accident when it is
called upon to account to a third party.
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rl.,hese faets are established: ~lr. Stoker was enlploy-ed on salary by appellant to c.all on government
installations; he was authorized to use an automobile
in his work and paid Inileage between Salt Lake City to
his points of c.all and return; he was in the habit of calling on Mr. Rich and soliciting business for his employer
(six orders in 1954) ; an order 'vas taken from Mr. Rich
on the day of the accident; the identical order was phoned
to appellant by I\1r. Rich on the day following the accident; I\1r. Stoker 'vas returning to Salt Lake City when
the accident occurred. (This fact ''Till be fully discussed
under Point II.)
Appellant, for the most part, concedes these facts,
with the exception, they say, that the testimony of ~Ir.
Rich as to the order given Mr. Stoker, is "hard to believe." Also, appellant says that nothing is known of
the wl1ereabouts of Mr. Stoker prior to 4:00 P.M. on
the day of accident and, therefore, the fact that he solicited from and received an order fro1n 1\Ir. Rich is insufficient to bring him within the course of his employment. First, appellant is in a much better position to
kno'v the 'vhereabouts of its .agent than is respondent.
If there was evidence that would take him out of the
course of his employment, I an1 sure that they would
have produced it before the trial court. Second, the
order placed by I\Ir. Rich amounted to $257.00 including
the cash given for the 1(-22 revolv·er. Certainly appellant
eannot claim that they did not receive an economic gain
fron1 that transaction; and clearly, this single transaction i ~ ~ufficient to place the agent 'vi thin the course
of his Pinployinent.
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The facts contain·ed in the record are consistent with
the general rule governing a case where the employee is
driving his own car. 5A Am. Jur., Automobiles, Sec. 653.
"On the question of the liability of an employer for negligence of his employee while operating a motor vehicle in the course of his employment, the question of who owned the automobile
involved in the accident ordinarily is not material,
if its u.se is authorized by the employer. While the
fact that an employee use~s his own automobile
in the business of the employer does not make
the latter liable under the doctrine of respondeat
superior for injuries inflicte,d by such employee
in the operation of the auto1nobile, if the circumstances involved in the case are consistent with,
or require, the inference that the activity in which
the servant was engaged at the time of the tort
complained of, and in which h·e was using his own
car or one vvhich he had hired, was within the
scope of his employment, the person injured may
recover from the employer, if the servant's use
of the, automobile or other vehicle was authorized,
either expressly or impliedly, $**"
·
For a discussion of .a situation involving an insurance agent operating over a somewhat extended area in
his own automobile, see the Utah case of Chatelain v.
Thackeray, 100 P.2d 191 (Utah).
"Thackeray w.as not using an automobile for
his 'own personal convenience and comfort,' as
was said of the agent in American National Insurance c·ompany v. Kennedy, supra (101 S.W.
2d 827), he was using it in the vital pursuit of
not only his own, but app·ellant's business, and
he was under appellant's control, not only as to
the results to be obtained from that pursuit, but,
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impliedly at lea.st, as to the means whereby he
obtained them."
Under the facts and circumstances of that case,
Thackeray was determined to be the agent of the defend.;.
ant insurance company.
It is to be noted, also, that appellant does not claim
that Mr. Stoker had abandoned his employment after he
left the place of business of Mr. Rich or deviated from
his route and consequently respondent will not devote
argument to that point. It will suffice to point out that
once the relation of agency is shown it is presumed to
continue until the contrary is shown. Wigmore on Evidence, Third Ed., Sec. 2530. In this case, nfr. Stoker
would be the agent within the course and scope of his
employ from Salt Lake City to his points of call and return. On the day in question, he was shown to be in the
course and scope of his employ at the place of business
of Mr. Rich. This would continue until his return to
Salt Lake City, absent evidence to the contrary. No such
evidence was presented by appellant.
The facts amply sustain the finding of the lower
court that Mr. Stoker "~as in the course and scope of
his employ for appellant at th·e tin1e of the accident.
POINT III.
WAYNE N. STOKER, THE AGENT FOR APPELLANT,
WAS NEGLIGENT, AND SUCH NEGLIGENCE CAUSED
THE COLLISION.
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At the outset, it must be pointed out that certain
statements contained in appellant's brief concerning
the lack of evidence as to which direction each vehicle
was traveling are not borne out by the record.
Appellant states, "Actually, there. is no concrete evidence to establish in which direction
either car was traveling."
"Actually, the physical evidence would more
forcibly pomt to the conclusion that Gore was
traveling e'asterly and Stoker westerly since the
vehicles were facing generally in .such direction
.after the impact."
"As heretofore pointed out ther,e is a total
lack of direct evidence of the manner or direction
in which Wayne N. Stoker drove his automobile
prior to the collision. ***"
On the 22nd day of August, 1956, respondent served
upon appellant the following request for admissions
pursuant to rule 36, U.R.C.P.:
"That at the time and place of the automobile
accident referred to in Paragraph 1 of Plaintiff's
complaint, Wayne N. Stoker was operating a De
Soto sedan, traveling in an easterly direction
toward Salt Lake City on U.S. Highway No. 40
and that at the time and place aforesaid the plaintiff's agent Richard E. Gore was op·erating a 1953
Plymouth Station Wagon, traveling in a westerly
direction from Salt Lake City on U.S. Highway
No. 40."
To this request appellant served a reply on the 13th
day of September, 1956, stating:
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"Defendant admits the statements contained
in paragraph 2 of said Request for Admissions.~'
(Paragraph 2 is the statement quoted above.)
Thus, the direction in which each vehicle was traveling was established by admission.
Both drivers were killed in the collision and there
were no eye witnesses. The facts constituting negligence
on the part of Mr. Stoker are based on the physical evidence found at the scene of the accident. Testimony as
to this evidence was given by Mr. A. H. Nordgren, a
Salt Lake County Deputy Sheriff from 1\!agna, Utah.
He received a call to investig.ate this accident at about
9:00 P.~1., October 13, 1954. How long before that the
accident occurred is not known. When he arrived on the
scene he found that each vehicle was severely damaged
on the front end indicating that the vehicles had met
head-on. IIe also found that the accident occurred in
the westbound lane of traffic, (the lane occupied by Mr.
Gore, respondent's agent) thus sho"ring that the vehicle
operated by Nir. Stoker, appellant's agent, had crossed
to the left of the center line of the highway before the
accident. The point of ilnpact "\vas determined by locating debris and gouge n1arks on the roadway. (See Ex.
8, which is reproduecd herein.) The debris and gouge
marks cornn1enced three feet into the lane occupied by
re.spondent's vehicle and continued further over toward
the shoulder. Considering the fact that the vehicles met
head-on at a 180° angle, it is clear that the Stoker vehicle
was at least three feet into the lane occupied by respondent's vehicle at the point of impact (R. 53-59, .and Ex. 8).
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Appellant apparently concedes that their agent was
on the wrong side of the road and that under such circumstances a pre.sumption of negligence arises by reason
of certain Utah decisions.

Richards v. Palace Laundry, 186 P. 439 (Utah);
Staton v. Western Macaroni Mfg. Co., 174 P. 821
(Utah);
Morrison v. Perry, 140 P.2d 772 (Utah).
However, appellant claims that such a p-resumption
does not apply to this case by reason of this court's ruling in Fretz v. Anderson, 300 P. 2d 642. First of all, that
action could not have been brought except for the recent
st.atute (U.C.A. 1953, 78-11-12) providing for the ~survival
of a cause of action against the personal representative
of a deceased wrongdoer. The case at bar was not
brought under that statute. This action is against an
employer on the theory of respondeat superior. The employer is liable jointly and severally 'vith the agent. 57
C.J.S., Master and Servant, Sec. 579.
Furthermore, this action is one for property damage. As this court stated in its decision on rehearing of
Fretz v. Anderson, 308 P. 2d 948 (Utah) the statute
(survival of actions for injury and death against the
personal representative of a deceased wrongdoer) doe·s
not control a claim for p-roperty damage.
Let us for the moment examine the content and
me.aning of this presumption. In Morrison v. Perry, 140
P .2d 772, this court said, ·
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"Defendant in his brief says that it is true
that when a collision occurs on the defend·ant's
wrong side of the road a presumption of negligence arises in. the absence of evidence explaining
why his car was on the wrong side of the road.
Defendant then vigorously argues that the
moment an explanation is offered, the presumption ceases and does not longer exist. This is true,
but the evidence upon which the presumption was
based remains in the case and is to be considered
by the jury, unless there is no conflict between
such evidence and the explanatory evidence."
(Citing eases.)
See also 9 Wigmore on Evidence, Third Edition, Section 2491.
In the absence of explanatory evidence, this presumption satisfies the plaintiff's burden of proof and
will sustain a finding in his favor. In the ease at bar,
no explanatory evidence was offered by appellant and the
court found that appellant's agent v.ras negligent in being
on the wrong side of the road.
Now assun1e for so1ne legal reason (there was no explanatory evidence) that the presun1ption is not available to the respondent. Still, as the eourt said in Morrison v. Perry, supra, the faets giving rise to the presulnption remain in the case, the 'veight and sufficiency to be
determined by the trier of fact.
In thi.s ease the fact ren1ains that appellant's .agent
was on the 'vrong side of the road 'vhen the accident
happened. And as this eourt said in Horsley v. Robinson_,
186 P. 2d 592, (1Jtah) at page 599.,
\
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"This is a finding of negligence from the
surrounding facts and circumstances and not
merely from the happening of the accident alone.
It is universally recognized that negligence may
be inferred from the happening of the accident
and the surrounding facts and circumstances
where the facts are such as to reasonably justify
such inference even though there is no direct testimony to establish the exact grounds of negligence
which caused the accident."
Therefore, even if the presumption of negligence
were removed from the case, still from the facts of the
accident, negligence may be inferred by the trier of fact.
In this .case, that finding is sufficient by reason of the
fact that cle.arly the agent of appellant was entirely on
the vvrong sidP of the road when the accident happened.
Further, as Professor Wigmore states in Section 3491,
supra, this presumption is a presumption of fact and not
law and therefore not a true presumption at all. The
term presumption has been applied by the use of inexact
terminology. What it is, is a factual situation which by
reason of experience carries to a conclusion and "conviction of mind" with compelling force. This, I venture,
is exactly the process by which the trial court reached
its finding. Based, as shown, upon sufficient evidence.
Appellant's argument th.at they are not responsible
for their agents being on the wrong side of the road because of this court's ruling in Fretz v. Anderson, supra,
is without merit. Carried to its extreme, it would mean
that in a case where both drivers are killed and there are
no eye witnesses there could be no recovery. Such a
universal proposition will not stand the test of logic and
reason.
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One other proposition of appellant merits comment.
They place great stress on the testimony of an insurance
investigator for appellant's insurer to the effect that
vehicles traveling east on U.S. Highway No. 40 were deflected into the opposing lane of traffic by a depression
in the highway at the r.aiload tracks which were about
250 feet west of the scene of the accident.
Sheriff Nordgren, a disinterested witness, testified
that he had traveled the _s,ame highway at speeds of up
to 70 mph and . had no difficulty in negotiating this
curve (R. 67).
In view of this conflicting testimony, the finding of
the trial court against appellant, is conclusive.
CONCLUSION
Appellant has asked in its brief for this court to reexamine all of the facts in this case, draw therefrom inferences in its favor, and reach a result contrary to that
of the trial court. The theory of appellant's appeal, however, is that there is insufficient evidence to justify the
findings and judgment.
Under that theory, this court need only deter1nine,
indeed may only determine, whether there is evidence in
the record to support the findings and judgment of the
trial court.
The facts are without material dispute and are sufficient (more, they preponderate) to show that appellant's agent vvas within the course and scope of his em-
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ploy at the time of this collision and the collision was
caused by his negligence.
The findings and judgment of the trial court should
be affirmed.

Respectfully submitted,
THOMAS & ARMSTRONG
EDWARD M. GARRETT
Attorneys for Respondent

511 Walker Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
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